In an ongoing lawsuit filed by Board Trustee Radhika Janga against the Hindu Society of Nevada (HSON) and Pandit Ji Brijesh Raval, Raval has retained the services of respected Indian-American lawyer Milan Chatterjee. Chatterjee has filed a motion with a court requesting to dismiss the case.  The court filings by Chatterjee argues that the claims asserted by plaintiff Radhika Janga should be dismissed because they seek judicial intervention in matters protected from civil-court interference by the First Amendment. Alternatively issue a summary judgement in Raval’s favor or staying this action and compel mediation and arbitration in accordance with Section 12.3 of the amended and restated bylaws of The Hindu Society of Nevada and NRS 38.221. In support, over 146 pages of documents are filed by Raval’s attorney, Chatterjee, to justify the above request. Further the filing argues that Plaintiff’s claims also fail because Janga lacks standing and capacity to assert claims belonging to the religious organization, Hindu Society of Nevada (HSON).

Per the court filings, Chatterjee argues the complaint fails for reasons that have nothing to do with religion. Plaintiff Janga does not sue in her own right. She sues “as Trustee on behalf of” The Hindu Society of Nevada (“HSON”)—an entity she names as a defendant, whose Board has never authorized this suit, and whose By-Laws vest all corporate authority in a Board that acts only by a seventy-five percent quorum and vote, forbid individual trustees from any involvement in “the activities of the Temple Priests,” and reserve the suspension or expulsion of employees to a ratified Board process whose decision is “final.” 

Per the HSON’s bylaws, a single trustee—let alone the spouse of the trustee of record—has no power to commandeer the corporation’s claims. The “deadlock” Plaintiff describes is not futility; it is HSON’s chosen supermajority rule working as designed, and the Legislature has supplied a remedy for it—a court-appointed provisional director under NRS 82.311—that Plaintiff has not invoked.

Further, the Board holds “the final authority in matters of policy” and manages “all of the assets of the Society and the Temple.” Trustees “in their roles as Trustees shall not have any involvement in the daily activities of the Society and/or the activities of the Temple Priests,” and “shall not have the ability to make decisions in such daily operations as Trustees.” Day-to-day affairs are conducted by the Executive Committee, and under HSON’s Employee Handbook “each employee at the Hindu Temple is accountable to the Temple President.  The bylaws clearly prescribe the only process by which an employee may be suspended or expelled: the Executive Committee or Board initiates it; the Board ratifies it by a seventy-five percent vote.

 Per the bylaws, each Trustee, Executive Committee Member and General Board Member “agree to first attempt in good faith to resolve the Dispute through confidential mediation,” to be “initiated by written notice” and “completed within sixty (60) days of the notice to mediate”. In December 2024 the Board approved a one-year employment term for the priests for calendar year 2025; a letter reflecting that term was handed to the priests but never signed, and by the Chairman’s own account “there is currently no approved employment agreement in effect.” Later, in April 2026 the Chairman circulated, for the May 9 meeting, a proposed employment agreement and a proposed separation agreement for each priest; the Board never approved either. The gatherings that followed in 2026 lacked a quorum and took no action.

Trustees holding five of HSON’s thirteen Active Trustee positions have declared under oath that they do not support removing Mr. Raval and that the decision belongs to the Board, which has not made it.

Per the court records, Chatterjee arguing that each claim independently fails to state a claim.

The religion clauses bar the relief plaintiff Janga is seeking.  Civil courts may not decide who will serve as a religious body’s minister. The First Amendment protects the right of religious institutions “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. 

Further, it is argued that plaintiff Janga lacks standing and capacity to sue “on Behalf of” HSON. The claims belong to HSON, which acts only through its Board. Because Janga lacks the requisite standing and capacity to assert claims belonging to HSON, those claims should be dismissed. Each individual cause of action also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. At minimum, the Court should enforce the parties’ agreed dispute-resolution procedures and stay the action pending mediation and, if necessary, arbitration.